Kremlin orders Russians to defend their own skies as military air defense crumbles -RFU News

[2naSalit]

In this video, we will analyze how Russia’s decision to shift responsibility for defense backfired.

Here, unable to defend their own sky, the Russian authorities have told private companies to fend for themselves and protect their own facilities from Ukrainian strikes instead. However, the flawed nature of the plan and the organizational limitations have led to a complete defense failure, with cities burning.

The new policy immediately exposes several major weaknesses, as modern air defense depends on integrated command networks for rapid decision-making and coordinated engagement procedures by trained operators. Large corporations may have the money to buy equipment, but they generally lack the expertise necessary to operate military-grade systems effectively. More importantly, creating dozens or hundreds of separate defensive networks risks producing fragmented coverage across Russia. Wealthier companies may indeed succeed in protecting themselves, while less profitable facilities will remain exposed. Rather than strengthening national air defense, the policy risks creating a patchwork system full of exploitable gaps.

Officially, the measure of the Russian government was intended to increase the number of mobile air-defense groups and strengthen protection of strategic infrastructure. The idea was to allow private companies to purchase anti-aircraft artillery systems, radars, electronic-warfare equipment, and interceptor systems themselves. Unofficially, it reflects the much harsher reality in which the Russian military can no longer adequately defend the growing number of targets threatened by Ukrainian long-range drones.

However, due to the Russian officials fearing any future unrest, any military equipment used in this manner will not formally belong to the companies themselves. Instead, it will remain under military control and be operated through reservist formations attached to regional defense units.

The flaws in the plan became particularly visible during Ukraine's massive drone assault on Moscow, when waves of long-range drones penetrated even the heavily defended airspace around the capital. Russian authorities claimed hundreds of drones were intercepted, yet multiple still reached their targets. The Gazprom Neft refinery in Kapotnya, targeted already just days before, is the most important fuel-producing facility serving the Moscow region, supplying half of the capital's fuel consumption.

Videos recorded by residents showed drones flying at low altitude over Moscow before powerful explosions erupted around the refinery. Witnesses captured enormous fires, thick columns of black smoke, and huge secondary explosions, forcing temporary airport closures and damaging nearby infrastructure.

The attack highlighted how, when air defenses become saturated by large drone swarms and are used by inexperienced operators, mistakes become more likely. Failed interceptions, mistimed engagements, and falling debris caused damage of their own in Moscow. Defensive systems attempting to destroy incoming drones created additional hazards for the very infrastructure they are meant to protect, as clearly visible in the last attack when an air defense rocket hit a large oil storage tank and blew up its roof into the air.

What makes this development especially interesting is that Russia appears to be adapting a concept Ukraine introduced at the end of two thousand twenty five, when Ukrainian authorities authorized enterprises and licensed security organizations to participate in air defense. Companies were allowed to purchase remotely operated weapon stations, interceptor systems, and supporting equipment while integrating directly into a centralized Air Force command structure. By May this year, dozens of Ukrainian companies had reportedly joined the program, contributing to successful interceptions of eight five percent of Russian drones they targeted.

However, the crucial difference lies in implementation, as Ukraine grants participants meaningful operational flexibility while maintaining centralized coordination. Russia, by contrast, remains reluctant to provide private organizations with real control, with the hesitation stemming largely from political concerns and fear of mutiny. The stigma of providing companies and oligarchs with military-grade weapons is a heavy one in Russia, the last time this happened, a fifty-thousand strong Wagner army marched on Moscow. As a result, the Kremlin seeks additional defensive capacity while simultaneously ensuring that private entities never possess real independent military power capable of rivalling state control.